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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MARION MARSH, 
Petitioner/Appellee, 
-vs-
SCOTT ALLAN MARSH, 
Respondent/Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Appeal No. 970696-CA 
: Civil No. 894891070-DA 
: Priority No. 15 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
THE HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS PRESIDING 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over 
this appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN, § 78-2A-3(2) (h) (1953 as 
amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court correctly ruled that Appellee 
was entitled to a portion of Appellant's military separation pay 
where Appellee was awarded a portion of Appellant's possible 
military retirement benefits in the Divorce Decree, and at the 
time Appellee was awarded a portion of the separation pay, 
Appellant had earned a longevity pension. 
In reviewing a modification of a divorce decree, "[t]rial 
1 
courts have considerable discretion to adjust divorcing parties' 
financial and property interests."' Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 
767 P.2d 121, 122 (Utah App. 1988) (citing Ruhsam v. Ruhsam, 742 
P.2d 123, 124 (Utah App. 1987)). "The discretionary power to 
fashion an equitable property division extends equally to 
subsequent modifications of an earlier decree." Id. (citing 
McCrary v. McCrarv, 599 P.2d 1248, 1250 (Utah 1979)). "Moreover, 
the trial court's actions are entitled to a presumption of 
validity." Id. (citing Ruhsam, 742 P.2d at 124). "Absent a 
showing of a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion, [the 
Appellate Court] will not interfere with an alimony or property 
award." 16^ (citing Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1078 
(Utah 1988); Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah App. 1987)). 
2. Whether the trial court correctly ruled that Appellee 
was not in contempt where the Decree of Divorce ordered Appellant 
to pay child support and alimony and ordered Appellee to hold 
Appellant harmless on a home mortgage, and Appellant 
intentionally refused to pay support and was over $7,000.00 in 
arrears, and the mortgage was foreclosed due to Appellee's 
inability to pay the mortgage because of Appellant's refusal to 
pay support. 
"[T]he generally accepted rule is that the issuance of an 
order relating to contempt of court, or the holding of a party in 
contempt of court, are matters which are not mandatory upon the 
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trial judge, but rest within his sound discretion." Bartholomew 
v. Bartholomew, 548 P.2d 238, 240 (Utah 1976)(citations omitted). 
"In the absence of any action in that regard which is so 
unreasonable as to be classified as capricious and arbitrary, or 
a clear abuse of his discretion, this court on review would not 
disagree with his determination and compel such an action." Id. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The determinative provisions for this appeal are 10 U.S.C. 
§§ 627-1174 and § 1408 (See Exhibit "A", Aplt. Brief) which 
govern military separation pay and pension and retirement 
benefits. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal arises from a Decree of Divorce and subsequent 
motions and petition. The parties to this action were married 
for approximately fifteen years. The Decree awarded Appellee a 
portion of Appellant's military retirement benefits and ordered 
Appellant to pay child support and alimony to Appellee. The 
Decree also ordered Appellee to hold Appellant harmless on the 
home mortgage. After the Decree was entered, Appellant was 
involuntarily discharged from the military and received 
"separation pay." Upon learning of this disbursement, Appellee 
made a claim to receive her portion of the disbursement, and 
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Appellant objected and moved to hold Appellee in contempt for 
failing to hold Appellant harmless on the home mortgage. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The court below, the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis presiding, 
entered the decree of divorce on August 16, 1989. Appellee filed 
her Verified Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce and 
Motion for Relief on January 4, 1995. Appellant filed his Answer 
on March 8, 1995. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
were filed on June 9, 1997 along with the Order and Order of 
Modification. Appellant filed his Objection to Proposed Order on 
June 13, 1997. The Notice of Entry of Order was filed on June 
16, 1997, and Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal on July 9, 
1997. 
III. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The parties to this action were married on April 20, 1974, 
in Manti, Utah. (Complaint, R. at 1). The parties were divorced 
on August 16, 1989. (Decree of Divorce, R. at 38). Appellee was 
awarded physical custody of the parties' four minor children. 
(Decree, R. at 39). Appellant was ordered to pay $300.00 per 
month per child, for a total of $1,200.00 in child support, to 
Appellee. (Decree, R. at 41). Appellant was also ordered to pay 
Appellee $468.00 per month in alimony. (Decree, R. at 42). The 
Decree awarded Appellee ll/40ths of all Appellant's military 
retirement benefits. (Decree, R. at 43). Appellee was also 
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ordered to hold Appellant harmless on the mortgage secured by the 
marital residence. (Decree, R. at 44). 
In November, 1991, Appellant was involuntarily discharged 
from his employment with the United States Navy. (Transcript at 
52, Aplt. Exhibit "E"). Appellant received $30,000.00 in 
severance pay in February, 1992. (Transcript at 52, Aplt. 
Exhibit "E"). 
Subsequent to Appellant's discharge, and after receiving the 
$30,000.00 in severance pay, Appellant intentionally refused to 
pay his support obligations to Appellee, and by November 25, 
1992, Appellant had accrued $7,637.00 in arrearages in family 
support. (Order, R. at 114). Due to Appellant's willful failure 
to pay the support and alimony ordered by the court, Appellee was 
unable to maintain the mortgage on the house. (Affidavit, R. at 
210). The house was foreclosed on March 10, 1992. (Affidavit, 
R. at 210). Due to the foreclosure, a debt of $12,469.58 was 
established against Appellant. (Letter, R. at 227). However, 
upon Appellant's request, a waiver was granted on December 13, 
1993, relieving Appellant of this debt. (Letter, R. at 227). 
Although the debt was waived by the Department of Veterans' 
Affairs, Appellant moved for an order to show cause seeking an 
order holding Appellee in contempt for failing to hold Appellant 
harmless on the mortgage as ordered by the Decree. (Motion, R. 
at 230). 
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In the hearing held on this matter on November 7, 1994, 
before Commissioner Michael S. Evans, with counsel for both 
parties present, the court found that Appellant's failure and 
refusal to pay the previously ordered child support and alimony 
payments to Appellee was the direct cause of Appellee's inability 
to pay the mortgage payments on the real property, (Minute 
Entry, R. at 239, Response, R. at 256). On November 18, 1994, 
Appellant filed his objection to Commissioner Evan's 
recommendation, (Objection, R. at 240). On or about January 4, 
1995, Appellee filed her Verified Petition for Modification of 
Divorce Decree and Motion for Relief. (Petition, R. at 281). 
Appellee's Petition sought to modify child support and asserted 
her claim to ll/40ths of the separation pay received by 
Appellant. (Petition, R. at 283) . 
On April 17, 1997, these issues came to trial before the 
Honorable Leslie A. Lewis. (Findings, R. at 454). Judge Lewis 
found that Appellant's objection to Commissioner Evans' 
recommendation should be denied because Appellee only failed to 
make payments on the mortgage after Appellant intentionally 
failed to pay his child support and alimony obligations, and the 
deficiency owed due to the foreclosure was waived so that 
Appellant paid no monies out of pocket due to the foreclosure. 
(Findings, R. at 455). Judge Lewis also found that the 
$30,000.00 disbursement made to Appellant when he separated from 
6 
the Navy was either a marital asset or in anticipation of 
retirement and therefore an advance on retirement. (Findings, R. 
at 458). This finding was based on the expert testimony of Neil 
B. Crist and because at the time of trial, Appellant's retirement 
was fully vested. (Findings, R. at 457, Transcript at 70 , 
Appellant's Testimony, Aplt. Exhibit XXE"). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The parties to this action were married for approximately 
fifteen years. The Divorce Decree awarded Appellee ll/40ths of 
Appellant's military retirement benefits. Upon being 
involuntarily separated from the military, Appellant elected to 
receive $30,000.00 in separation pay. At the time of trial, 
Appellant had completed twenty years of service in the military. 
Therefore, his retirement benefits had vested. 
Under 10 U.S.C. §1174, because Appellant elected to receive 
separation pay, and because he later reenlisted and earned his 
retirement benefits, Appellant must pay back the separation pay 
through deductions from his retirement benefits. Therefore, the 
trial court correctly ruled that, because Appellant's retirement 
benefits had vested at the time of trial, this separation pay was 
an advance on his retirement benefits and Appellee was entitled 
to her ll/40ths share. 
In addition, the trial court was within its discretion in 
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denying Appellant's objection to Commissioner Evan's ruling 
restricting Appellant's rights under the Divorce Decree and 
denying Appellant's motion to hold Appellee in contempt. The 
Divorce Decree ordered Appellant to pay family support and 
Appellee to hold Appellant harmless on a mortgage. Appellant 
intentionally refused to pay the court-ordered family support. 
This intentional refusal caused Appellee to be unable to pay the 
mortgage payments. Because Appellee was unable to make the 
payments due to Appellant's inequitable conduct, the court was 
within its discretion in denying Appellant's motion for contempt. 
In addition, the trial court was within its discretion in 
restricting Appellant's rights under the Divorce Decree because 
"equity refuses to lend its aid to a party whose conduct is 
inequitable." 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT APPELLEE WAS 
ENTITLED TO 11/4QTHS OF APPELLANT'S SEPARATION PAY. 
"Marital property 'encompasses all of the assets of every 
nature possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and from 
whatever source derived; and this includes any such pension fund 
or insurance." Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Utah 
1988) (quoting Enalert v. Enalert, 576 P.2d 1274 (Utah 1978)). 
Utah's definition of marital property includes deferred 
compensation. See Gardner, 748 P.2d at 1078-79; Woodward v. 
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Woodward, 656 P.2d 431, 432-33 (Utah 1982). "The essential 
criterion is whether a right to the benefit has accrued in whole 
or in part during the marriage. To the extent the right has so 
accrued it is subject to equitable distribution." Woodward, 656 
P.2d 432-33. 
The parties' Divorce Decree awarded Appellee ll/40ths of all 
pension and retirement benefits that Appellant may receive. 
During the parties' fifteen year marriage, Appellant accrued an 
interest in a military pension. In addition, during the 
marriage, Appellant accrued the right to elect to receive 
separation pay based on his years of service. If Appellant 
elected to take the separation pay, and in the event that 
Appellant would qualify for retirement, 10 U.S.C. §1174(h) would 
require that the separation pay amount would be withheld from the 
retirement benefits until paid off. 
A member who has received separation pay under this 
section, or separation pay, severance pay, or readjustment 
pay under any other provision of law, based on service in 
the armed forces, and who later qualifies for retired or 
retainer pay under this title or title 14 shall have 
deducted from each payment of such retired or retainer pay 
so much of such pay as is based on the service pay under 
this section or separation pay, severance pay, or 
readjustment pay under any other provision of law until the 
total amount deducted is equal to the total amount of 
separation pay, severance pay, and readjustment pay 
received. 10 U.S.C. §1174(h)(1)(emphasis added). 
Appellant did elect to take the separation pay in the amount 
of $30,000.00 upon being involuntarily discharged. The 
separation pay was treated as an advance on his retirement by 
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Appellant on his W-2 form and by the IRS. In addition, Appellant 
did qualify for retirement benefits after reenlisting in the 
reserve and prior to trial in this matter. (Transcript at 70, 
Appellant's Testimony, Aplt. Exhibit "E"). Therefore, under 
§1174, prior to Appellant or Appellee receiving their respective 
shares of the retirement benefits, the $30,000.00 would have to 
be deducted from the retirement benefits. This is achieved by 
deducting 75% of every payment until the $30,000.00 is repaid. 
(Transcript at 42, Aplt. Exhibit "E"). 
Mr. Crist, the expert witness in this case estimated that 
Appellant's retirement benefit would be around $1,800.00 per 
month. (Transcript at 44, Aplt.. Exhibit "E"). Appellee's 
ll/40ths share of this would be $495.00 per month. Because 
Appellant elected to take the separation pay, 75% of the 
retirement benefits will be withheld until this amount is paid 
back. Therefore, $1,350.00 will be withheld, reducing Appellee's 
ll/40ths to $123.75 per month. This will continue until the 
$30,000.00 is paid off, approximately two years. If Appellee is 
not awarded her share of the separation pay, this will have the 
effect of causing an enormous hardship and injustice by reducing 
Appellee's share of the retirement benefits and keeping Appellee 
from being made whole, as well as requiring Appellee to pay back 
ll/40ths of the $30,000.00 for Appellant. 
Appellant argues that military retirement pay and separation 
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pay are not related and must be handled separately because 
"someone who receives the separation payment will not necessarily 
receive retirement." However, in the present case, Appellant, at 
the time of trial, had qualified for retirement. (Transcript at 
70, Appellant's Testimony, Aplt. Exhibit "E"). Therefore, 
Appellant will receive retirement benefits. In addition, because 
Appellant qualified for retirement benefits, these benefits are 
substantially related to the separation pay under §1174(h). Once 
Appellant qualified for retirement benefits, the separation pay 
became an advance on retirement under §1174, which would have to 
be repaid through deductions from the retirement benefits. 
Appellant also argues that while Utah does not have any case 
law concerning separation pay, the California case of Kuzmiak "is 
precisely on point." Kuzmiak v. Kuzmiak, 222 Cal. Rptr. 644 
(Cal. App. 2d 1986), cert, denied 479 U.S. 885 (1986). However, 
in Kuzmiak, at the time of trial, the husband was not entitled to 
retirement benefits because he had not completed his 20 years of 
service. Id. at 645. In our case, Appellant was entitled to 
retirement benefits at the time of trial. 
While the Kuzmiak case did not directly concern this issue, 
the California case did discuss the possibility of someone who 
took a separation pay and then reenlisted and subsequently earned 
retirement benefits. 
If a member reenlists after involuntary discharge and 
subsequently receives a longevity pension after serving 20 
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years, the purposes of the separation pay have not been 
fulfilled. Subdivision (h)(1) of section 1174 recognizes 
this by compelling reimbursement of separation pay from the 
members retirement payments. There is no reason for 
finding separation pay to be the member's separate property 
once the member reenlists and earns a longevity pension. 
Kuzmiak, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 647 (emphasis added). 
This is exactly what happened in the present case. Appellant 
elected to take his separation pay. He reenlisted. He earned his 
retirement benefits. Therefore, under the Kuzmiak reasoning, 
there is no reason for finding Appellant's separation pay to be 
Appellant's separate property. 
Appellant argues that the Kuzmiak court "concluded" that 
separation pay is the separate property of the service member. 
However, while this may be true for service members who have not 
qualified for retirement yet, this is a misstatement of the 
"conclusion" of the Kuzmiak court. The Kuzmaik conclusion is 
clearly stated on page 648 of the decision. It states: 
For these reasons, we conclude that wife has a community 
property interest in husband's longevity pension, including 
the $30,000 separation pay the government will withhold 
from his retirement benefits. This holding recognizes the 
separate property characteristic of the separation pay 
(until husband's actions in reenlisting and earning a 
longevity pension) and also protects wife's rights to a 
community property asset. Kuzmiak, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 648 
(emphasis added). 
Therefore, the Kuzmiak holding supports the trial court in the 
present case that if the service member reenlists and earns 
retirement benefits, the separation pay becomes an advance on the 
retirement benefits under §1174, and as such, Appellee is 
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entitled to her ll/40ths share of the separation pay. 
While separation pay is generally separate property, once a 
service member, such as Appellant, reenlists and earns a 
retirement benefit, the separation pay becomes an advance on the 
retirement benefits as held by the trial court and Kuzmiak, and 
must be repaid through retirement pay deductions under §1174. 
Retirement benefits are marital property subject to distribution 
under Woodward. Appellee was awarded ll/40ths of Appellant's 
retirement benefits by the Divorce Decree. Therefore, the trial 
court correctly awarded Appellee ll/40ths of the separation pay 
as "an advance on retirement pay . . . accrued during marriage." 
(Transcript at 97, Aplt. Exhibit "E"). 
A. UNDER §1174 APPELLEE WILL PARTICIPATE IN THE 
REPAYMENT OF THE SEPARATION PAY. 
Appellant next argues that if Appellee is awarded ll/40ths 
of the separation pay, she should have to participate in the 
repayment. This is already provided for by 10 U.S.C. §1174. As 
stated above, because Appellant elected to receive separation pay 
and then reenlisted and qualified for retirement benefits, the 
separation pay will be repaid through deductions from the 
retirement benefits. Thus, 75% of the retirement pay is withheld 
until the $30,000.00 is repaid. Therefore, if the retirement 
benefit is $1,800.00, $1,350.00 will be withheld. During the 
repayment time, Appellee will receive $123.75 and Appellant will 
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receive $326.25. Had Appellant not elected to receive the 
separation pay, Appellee would have received $495.00 per month 
while Appellant would have received $1305.00 per month. 
Therefore, during the repayment time, Appellee is repaying 
$371.25 ($495.00 - $123.75) per month, which is exactly ll/40ths 
of $1,350.00 ($371.25 / $1,350.00), the entire repayment amount 
per month. Therefore, once the retirement benefits begin to be 
paid out, Appellee will repay her ll/40ths share of the 
separation pay thereby making both parties whole. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY 
REFUSING TO HOLD APPELLEE IN CONTEMPT WHERE APPELLANT 
INTENTIONALLY REFUSED TO PAY COURT-ORDERED SUPPORT TO 
APPELLEE CAUSING HER INABILITY TO MAKE PAYMENTS ON THE 
MORTGAGE. 
"It is generally accepted that the issuance of an order 
relating to contempt of court is discretionary with the trial 
judge." Kunzler v. O'Dell, 855 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah App. 1993) 
(citing Bartholomew v. Bartholomew, 548 P.2d 238, 240 (Utah 
1976) . "To find contempt, the court must find from clear and 
convincing proof that the contemnor knew what was required, had 
the ability to comply, and willfully and knowingly failed and 
refused to do so." Id. (citing Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 
1162, 1172 (Utah 1988))(emphasis added). 
The Decree of Divorce awarded child support and alimony to 
Appellee. The Decree also ordered Appellee to hold Appellant 
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harmless on the mortgage secured by the parties' marital 
residence. Appellant intentionally1 refused to pay his court 
ordered family support, thereby causing extreme hardship on 
Appellee and the parties' four children. By November, 1992, 
Appellant was $7,637.00 in arrears. 
During the period when Appellant refused to pay his family 
support obligations, and as a result of Appellant's refusal, 
Appellee could not keep the mortgage on the home current. 
(Affidavit, R. at 210). As a result of Appellee's inability to 
make the payments and due to Appellant's refusal to pay his 
ordered support obligations, the home was foreclosed. However, 
on December 13, 1993, by Appellant's request, the outstanding 
debt on the home was waived by the Veteren's Administration so 
that Appellant would not have to pay anything on the loan 
deficiency. (Letter, R. at 227). The trial court found that 
because Appellee's inability to pay the mortgage payments was a 
direct result of Appellant's intentional refusal to pay his 
family support obligations and because the deficiency owed was 
also waived, Appellee was not in contempt. Clearly such a ruling 
was within the trial court's discretion since the trial court 
determined that Appellee was unable to make the payments due to 
Appellant's intentional refusal to pay his support obligations. 
1
 Besides Appellant's other substantial sources of income, 
Appellant received $30,000.00 in separation pay in February of 
1992 and therefore could have met his support obligations. 
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Appellant also argues that "[t]he obligations of the Divorce 
Decree are separate obligations and should be treated as such." 
He then cites cases where the court held that generally 
visitation could not be denied merely because child support 
obligations had not been paid. However, visitation issues are 
only concerned with the best interests of the children. 
Appellant has not alleged that Appellee has denied Appellant any 
visitation rights. 
Appellant claims that the Rohr court "concluded that Ma] 
court may not deny the noncustodial parent visitation rights for 
the mere failure to pay child support, where the failure to pay 
is due to an inability to pay.'" (Aplt.. Brief quoting Rohr v. 
Rohr, 709 P.2d 382, 383 (Utah 1985)). However, this was not the 
"conclusion" of the Rohr court. The court actually held that 
because Mr. Rohr intentionally and willfully refused to pay child 
support and intentionally failed to abide by the court-ordered 
visitation schedule, the trial court properly restricted his 
visitation rights. Id. at 384. 
This is the same as the present case where Appellant 
intentionally refused to pay his family support obligations, and 
as a result, the trial court properly restricted his rights under 
the divorce decree. The Rohr holding was based on the general 
principle that "equity refuses to lend its aid to a party whose 
conduct is inequitable." Id. (citing Horton v. Horton, 695 P.2d 
16 
102, 107 (Utah 1984)(stating that "he who seeks equity must do 
equity"); Barbour v. Barbour, 330 P.2d 1093 (Mont. 1958); see 
also Masters v. Worsley, 777 P.2d 499, 502 (Utah App. 1989)). 
Therefore, because Appellee's inability to pay the mortgage 
was due to Appellant's inequitable conduct, the trial court was 
clearly within its discretion in denying Appellant's objection to 
Commissioner Evan's ruling. 
CONCLUSION 
Therefore, for the reasons set forth above, this Court 
should affirm the trial court's ruling, with costs awarded to 
Appellee as allowed by Rule 34 of the UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE 
PROCEDURE . 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this fO day of July, 1998. 
CORPORON Sc WILLIAMS, P.C, 
,LIE F. WILLIAMS. 
:torney for Appellee 
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